AAAS 280B BU The Chinese Experience in the Americas Research Paper A 10-page paper draft. This paper should be driven by a single thesis. Clearly argue a p | Course Hero
AAAS 280B BU The Chinese Experience in the Americas Research Paper A 10-page paper draft. This paper should be driven by a single thesis. Clearly argue a position about Chinese Political Economy. The thesis is where the position stands. The rest of the paper should be used to support this thesis. Feel free to use outside resources
Articles are attached below for writing the thesis statement.
1st page:
The first paragraph should include the following: it will define the topic and the premises of the topic; use the premises to define what interests them the most and use evidence to show this interest. The topic must be articulated in relationship to the class. The definition of a premise should involve a series of description of events that catch your attention (the what-where-how-who questions of these events). You should also have a clearly defined thesis, which the premise will support. The second paragraph should outline two theses (from two sources) on the chosen topic and two opposing (or indirectly opposing) theses on the same topic. You will then highlight how your thesis is different or the same as the outlined theses.
2nd Page:
(Bibliography) Once you define the premise and thesis, you should locate both peer review articles and book chapters that have discussed the issues that you are interested in. You should also list the news articles and book chapters that may be potentially useful for your paper (only list them in a bibliography). Your selection of articles and chapters should involve both newspapers and peer-reviewed articles and books.
The rest of the Draft Paper should expand on the premises of the paper. from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.
Research Foundation of State University of New York
The Process of Incorporation into the Capitalist World-System: The Case of China in the
Nineteenth Century
Author(s): Alvin Y. So
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 91-116
Published by: Research Foundation of State University of New York for and on behalf of
the Fernand Braudel Center
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Review, VIII, 1, Summer 1984, 91-116
The Process of Incorporation into
the Capitalist World-System:
The Case of China in the Nineteenth Century
AlvinY.So
In the mid 1970’s, Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out th
little work had been done on the important historical proces
of incorporation: “For at least three centuries this capital
world-economy functioned side by side with non-capital
social system outside it
it possible for the capitalist world-economy
them?” (1976: 134).1
The insight of this remark has stimulated th
capitalist world-system (hereafter referre
examine afresh the historical process of in
instances, Lubeck (1979) examined the role o
alism in the incorporation of Nigeria into the
and Schoenberg (1980) studied the long w
expansion and contraction from 1415 to 196
1 . Wallerstein (1979: 145) uses the term “incorporation” to re
tion of new geographical areas to the capitalist world-econ
posterior to the “initial” expansion of the sixteenth century wh
part of the transformation of feudal Europe into a capitalist
© 1984 Research Foundation of SUNY
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92
Alvin
Y.
So
studies in the Fernand Braudel Center that “focused on the
ways in which the complex process of incorporation worked in
three different periods of the world-system’s development in
forming three of its areas- 1650-1690, the Caribbean; 17501815, the Ottoman State (formerly the Ottoman Empire, later
Turkey); 1870-1920, Southern Africa” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1982: 129).
My aim is to join this recent development of incorporation
studies by examining the case of the nineteenth-century China,
with the hope that the Chinese experience will shed light on a
theory of the incorporation process in general.
There is of course no lack of good studies of the nineteenthcentury Chinese history, but very few of them have utilized the
world-system perspective. The two exceptions are Moulder’s
(1977) study of Japan and China and Basu’s (1979) study of the
opium connection. I shall discuss the findings of these two
studies at some length because they have important bearings
on our current study.
Moulder’s (1977) work has made a novel contribution to our
understanding of why Japan was able to become a core state in
the CWS while China was not, but his discussion on the
historical process of incorporation is rather weak. Moulder
seems to assume that the incorporation process was nonproblematic: that the core countries were so strong that they
could easily incorporate China into the CWS. For instance, he
asserts:
The Chinese resisted the expansion of both the opium and the textile
markets. This resistance was countered by the Opium War ( 1 840-1 842)
and by a second war, which Westerners term the Arrow War and the
Chinese term the Second Opium War (1858-1860). After China’s
defeat in these wars, encroachments on political economy were estab-
lished (1977: 105).
In this respect, Moulder’s analyses are similar to other early
studies of the CWS in that they expressed little need to do
research on the incorporation process (see Rodney, 1972: 150-
51; Frank, 1969:45).
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Incorporation of China 93
Basu’s study does have the merit of e
opium connection. He argues that th
process started as early as 1757 becaus
opium was imported into China f
disagree with Basu on this point, an
Chinese incorporation process start
1830’s. Since our dating is almost thre
apart, it is necessary to explain why t
The reason lies in our different conc
tion process. How do we know that
had started? What are its indices and characterization? These
are important questions because their answers serve to define
the boundary of the CWS at a certain stage of historical
development. In general, there are two indices of the incorporation process: one economic, the other, political. Economic
incorporation involves the restructuring of the production and
marketing processes in such a way that an area is increasingly
tied to the world-wide division of labor; political incorporation
generally refers to the transformation of rules in the area so
that its decision-making process is increasingly shaped by the
states in the core region, and the area is coerced to participate
in the CWS’s interstate system as a junior partner (Hopkins &
Wallerstein, 1982: 128-33). In general, economic incorporation
and political incorporation occur together. But how are we
going to characterize an area if there is a certain degree of
economic incorporation without political incorporation?
This is the point on which the current analyses differ from
those of Basu’s study. Basu argues that the importation of
opium into China in 1 757 should be taken as the starting point
of the incorporation process. I disagree with this dating on two
grounds. First, since a state could never completely sever itself
from foreign trade, a small increase in foreign trade should not
be taken as an index of the incorporation process. Instead, we
should examine the trend of foreign trade figures more rigorously to study whether there was any sudden important rise in
foreign trade that might exert structural changes in the local
economy. As I shall discuss shortly, the sudden expansion of
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94
Alvin
Y.
Chinese
So
foreign
Secondly,
it
is
no
necessary
to
stu
nomic
exchange
hindered
foreign
facilitated
econo
separation
and
u
ation
processes
i
very
CWS
interesting
boundary.
The
1830’s:
Part
without
Politica
Starting
from
th
there
had
been
n
its
boundary.
The
and
trading
boats
trade.
Then
arri
French,
and
the
failed
to
incorp
hand,
the
Wester
dom,
an
empire
herself,
and,
on
t
exclusive
policy
policy
regarded
f
“barbarians”
(Ch
vated
by
the
desir
In
this
respect,
M
Foreigners
were
th
Chinese,
except
thr
Peking
and
the
tea
intercourse
with
th
ment
expressively
subjects
from
all
fo
co
In
1836,
307
fore
ings
called
“facto
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Incorporation of China 95
These buildings were the property of Ha
leased to the foreigners, who were forb
these thirteen factories and were not allo
Canton. They could not even reside perm
ings as they had to leave South China at
season (Banister, 1931: 99; Murphy, 1977
Furthermore, there was the Kung-hang
with. See points out:
The main concern of the foreign trader was t
and if he did, he must sell it to his security mer
other
he could buy his export cargo, which consisted chiefly
. . . Silk, for which there existed a big demand, was li
140 piculs for any one vessel; and shipment of bullion w
except under a special permit (1919:66-67).
These restricted trading conditions naturally
volume of foreign trade between China and th
shows that China’s foreign trade made very lit
the sixteenth century to the end of the eight
was mostly a one-way traffic, with China expo
tities of tea, silk, and cloth but importing only
tities of cotton and wool in return. These favorable terms of
trade meant a net flow of silver coins from the West to China.
It was only when the British had set up the British India
colony in the mid-eighteenth century that they managed to
stop this outflow of silver to China. The British planted opium
in India, shipped it to China, and used it to pay for tea and silk.
In the beginning, the amount of Indian opium imported into
China was fairly small, about 200 chests in 1760 and about
4,000 chests in 1800. But opium importation rose drastically in
the early nineteenth century, jumping to 20,000 chests in the
1 820’s and 30,000 chests in the 1 830’s (Table 1 ; Hsiao, 1 967: 4 1 1 ;
Wong, 1976:23). This phenomenal increase in opium importation had exerted structural changes in the Chinese economy,
served to trigger the economic incorporation of certain regions
of China into the CWS, and provided the impetus to start the
political incorporation process.
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96
Alvin
Y.
So
TABLE 1
East
India
Trade1
yearly
Comp
with
Chin
average
im
(in thousand taels) Value on opium yearly
Imports Exports Number of (in thousands average (in
into China from China Chests taels) thousand taels)
1760-64 346 877 200
1765-69
520
1061
–
1770-74
620
1415
78
1775-79 384 1208 – – 120
1780-84 532 1633 – – 145
1785-89 1027 4437 2000 – 433
1790-94 2059 4025 – – 573
1795-99 1961 4277 4124 – 651
1800-04 3360 5759 3562 – 1242
1805-09 3956 4547 4281 – 1728
1810-14 3887 5608 4713 – 2313
1815-19 3406 5748 4420 4701 2351
1820-24 3418 6865 7889 8357 4516
1825-29 3648 6316 12,576 10,824 5744
1830-33 2988 5985 20,331 13,499 4165
SOURCES: Yen (1955: 6, 22, 23, 24) ; Pritchard (1970: 160).
l.The three largest imports are India cotton, woolens, and metals; the three
largest exports are tea, silk, and cloth.
First of all, the vast increase in opium importation in the
1930’s had resulted in Chinese trade deficits and caused the
draining of silver out of China. Silver was a precious metal
used as a measurement of large sums only, while the medium of
exchange among the peasants was copper cash. The outflow of
silver inevitably put its rate of exchange against the copper
cash. A tael of silver was worth about 1 ,000 copper cash in the
eighteenth century; it was worth about twice as much in the
1830’s. Since land taxes were fixed in terms of silver, the double
exchange rate between copper and silver coins meant that the
peasants were taxed twice as much. This brought about
extreme hardship to the small peasants (Nolde, 1966: 17;
Hsiao, 1967: 411; Wong, 1976: 23).
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Incorporation of China 97
Secondly, opium importation served to i
export trade because the West now had a sur
to buy the Chinese goods. Consequently, Chi
rose from 1,600,000 taels in the 1780’s to ab
in the 1830’s (Table 1). Greenberg (1951:44) p
the 1 830’s, certain groups, such as the tea cu
the silk producers in the Nanking district, an
Canton, began to depend on foreign tr
estimates that 50,000 cotton weavers and 17
Canton, and another 100,000 transportat
where along the trade route became part o
groups whose livelihood now hinged upon tr
ers. These linkages to the CWS could also b
market towns and villages. In the 1830’s, Sh
future center of the South China silk indust
sericulture on an increasing scale. Attracted
export prices, a few villages in Shun-te count
ize solely in silk production.
Thirdly, this rapid increase in opium impo
way for political incorporation of China in
the Chinese state had banned the importatio
turn of the nineteenth century, it was illegal fo
India Company to engage openly in the op
fore, the shipping of India’s opium to Ch
gated to the so-called country traders. Th
pany still monopolized the growing of opi
trade, but the country traders now had a free
opium into China. Thus in the beginning
century there were two types of foreign mer
traders and those affiliated with East India and other com-
panies. Since company traders enjoyed a monopoly on trade and
were able to reap rapid fortunes, they were quite satisfied with
the restricted trading conditions in Canton. However, when
free country traders began to come to China on an increasing
scale as a result of opium trade, they found the old Canton
trading system intolerable. They had no access to the markets,
and they could not even walk down a street of shops. In
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98
Alvin
Y.
So
addition,
they
c
prices,
but
in
all
prices
offered
by
hang.
By
the
late
the
freedom
to
bu
To
sum
up,
China
the
eighteenth
cen
and
because
the
C
the
conduct
of
he
nineteenth
centur
increase
of
opium
poration
of
certa
attempts
at
politi
The
at
Early
18409s:
Political
Incor
The
foreign
merc
tem
of
Chinese
d
accomplished.
Ind
regarded
foreign
dressed
the
fore
Hunter,
1882).
To
crack
the
trad
wage
a
war
agains
sioner
Lin
banned
the
burn
impo
stop
Lin
from
kil
united
and
sent
an
chuan
3:1).
This
w
In
the
spring
of
marched
through
British
troops
w
dozen
British
so
legendary
San-yii
torians
as
the
star
nineteenth
centu
lent
book
provides
of
the
sociopolitic
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Incorporation of China 99
detail. His thesis is that this incident was
taneous nor led by the peasantry. Inste
another in a long series of military str
upon the tacit sanction of the gentry. Sin
point, let us pursue the theme further.
The local gazetteers of South China poin
militarization that began in the early nin
upsurge of local militarization was histor
South China traditionally had militias org
villages from pirate attacks, the form
strongly discouraged by the Chinese stat
it gave the gentry military and political p
the local government (Grove, 1969:32;
Moreover, lineage conflicts and kinship d
China countryside also prevented the mili
a regional organization. Therefore, line
1840’s remained illegal and localized.
However, the threat of foreign conques
lign the power structure of South China
ways. First, militias were then organized
the village. The San-yùan-li militia, for i
villages and tens of thousands of peopl
Secondly, militias began to gain formal l
guise of being local academies or she-hsii
1840’s were mainly educational institutio
anti-foreign movement, however, the sh
formed into organizations to recruit men
for regional defense. These organizati
hsiieh” (“local academy”) rather than ”
because the former term sounded emin
could, thereby, receive official blessing f
(Hsiao, 1966:495; Wakeman, 1966:64).
hsueh was an organization of the gentry,
support than before. The destruction of n
the draining of silver out of China, the i
and the threat of foreign conquest had giv
ideological basis for uniting both the peas
side, and the guild craftsmen in the city t
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100
Alvin
Y.
intrusion
incident,
So
(Lieh
“upon
Tao,
the
s
gathered,
men
and
surrounded
them”
(
the
incident
spread
rushed
to
the
site
to
militia
organized
on
semi-official
blessing
strengthen
its
power
The
historical
signif
legend
glorify
of
the
the
anti-f
defeat
of
were
treated
as
her
1979,
Picture
13,15
British
soldiers
important
peasantry
was
were
the
thought
t
According
to
Wake
important
single
m
(Wakeman,
1966:53
Faced
with
such
str
British
changed
thei
Nanking,
and
won
signing
of
the
peac
foreign
trade,
1840’s,
China
and
had
CWS.
The 1840’s: Local Opposition and Desertion
Military defeats in the Opium War contributed directly to
the weakening of the Chinese state. In the 1840’s, the Chinese
were no longer able to control the conduct of the foreigners.
Consequently, there was the spectacular rise of illegal activity
in the treaty ports, as observed by a British consul:
Contempt for all Chinese authority, and disregard of inherent rights,
habitual infractions of treaty stipulations, license and violence wher-
ever the off-scum of the European nations found access, and peaceful
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th
b
Incorporation of China 1 0 1
people to plunder – such were the first fruits of t
sion (Quoted by Banister, 1931:42).
In addition to the enormous increase in op
was an increase in coolie traffic – namely,
tract, or indentured, labor to foreign coun
150,000 Chinese were part of this semi1847-62. Observing such illegal activitie
sioner of customers remarked:
China as a whole was invaded by a swarm of adventurers from many
nations during this period. Smuggling, trading in opium, the coolie
traffic, evasion of duties, dealing in arms and other contraband, were
engaged in all sides (Banister, 1931:41-42).
With the blessings of British consulates (Griffin, 1938: 244),
this illegal form of foreign penetration was turned into a driving force of history that, on the one hand, provided the basis
for vigorous foreign demands for more favorable trading conditions. This, in turn, lay the foundation for a more civilized
form of capitalist penetration. On the other hand, this also
aroused strong hatred from the people of South China who
were determined to keep the “barbarian” off their native soil.
The 1840’s, therefore, witnessed what Engels (1972:124) de-
cribed as the Chinese popular war against foreign intrusion.
After the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, the people of South
China had turned from being defensive to becoming offensive,
as recorded in detail in the British The Chinese Repository. For
in 1842, “the British flagstaff was set on fire, and burned
upwards till the whole was on fire; a shout from the mob when
it fell told their triumph. Meanwhile the British factor was
fired, and the verandah, chapel-belfry and skylight were soon
burning furiously.” Although the Treaty of Nanking allowed
foreigners to move their residences from the congested Kunghang to the city of Canton, foreigners were still denied this
privilege because the gentry “declared the impossibility of living under the same heavens with the English rebels, and swore
to destroy them.” When the foreigners pushed for their treaty
rights in 1846, riots occurred. ” ‘ Shat fan-kuei, ta fan-kwei’
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102
Alvin
r.
So
(‘kill the foreign dev
echoed through all th
factories. Hundreds of
and many hundreds m
The anti-foreign sen
government tactically
foreign nations to ere
premises, forty cubit
two
Vol.
cubit
15,
thick”
365;
Observing
At
least
active,
in
nay,
these
the
a
(Chin
1849;
Vo
loca
Southern
fanatical
par
poison the bread of the European community at Hong Kong
go with hidden arms on board trading steamers, an
journey, massacre the crew and European passenger
boat. They kidnap and kill every foreigner within
(1972:123).
Under such constant …
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