University of Florida Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards Measures Questions 1- Describe in your own words the available tools the IAEA might use to effec | Course Hero
University of Florida Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards Measures Questions 1- Describe in your own words the available tools the IAEA might use to effectively implement safeguards measures in those States with integrated safeguards. 2- Describe in your own words the origin, purpose, and implementation of the Additional Protocol. Geographical Information Systems and Satellite
Monitoring in Nuclear Safeguards
A. Poucet, S. Contini, F.Bellezza
European Commission
Joint Research Centre
J
R
C
Nuclear Safeguards
Nuclear Safeguards could be described as a
comprehensive set of internationally approved technical
and legal measures to verify the political undertakings of
States not to use nuclear material to manufacture nuclear
weapons
This control is performed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
European Union: EURATOM
Countries that voluntarily accept IAEA safeguards must
periodically declare their Nuclear Fuel Cycle activities
according to agreed protocols
Objectives of the Project
Develop an integrated system for supporting
Site level assessment
– Verify that the installations and activities for a given known site
correspond to the declarations provided (Correctness)
– Verify that there are no undeclared activities or installations
at the declared sites (Completeness)
Country level assessment
– Verify the consistency of all declared fuel cycle activities (Correctness)
– Verify that there are no undeclared installations or activities
in hidden sites (Completeness)
Information for site level assessment
Declarations submitted under the model agreement (INFCIRC/153):
nuclear materials accountancy data (movements and stocks)
design information and other information in facility attachments
Information submitted under the Strengthened Safeguards System
(INFCIRC/540): e.g.
information on R&D activities at the site
information on buildings on a nuclear site
imports and exports of specific equipment to/from the site
Data from inspections and results from environmental sample
analysis
In-house knowledge of nuclear fuel cycle facilities
Open source information: including maps, information on
infrastructure, satellite images
How to handle the data?
How to structure and manage such diverse information?
How to present the information to the user (inspector)?
How to compare declarations with information from open sources?
How to analyse the integrated picture?
How to exploit synergism between data sources?
Modeling of complex systems
Model used here to indicate a structured collection of
knowledge (qualitative and quantitative) and procedures that
supports the solving of a specific problem
Multiple dimensions or viewpoints: e.g.
topological: location, infrastructures
functional: processes, material flows
operational: activities, production, outages
Process
Topology
Operation
Each viewpoint is organised in multiple layers: different levels
of abstraction, from overview layers to more detailed
representations
Cross-links between elements in different viewpoints
Topology oriented view
Breakdown
World map
Country level
Nuclear Site level
Buildings level
Building floors
and rooms
Topology oriented view
Data
World map
Country level
Country level
safeguards data
Nuclear Site level
Site description
and lay-out
Buildings level
Building
description and
use
Building floors
and rooms
Topology oriented view
Verification
Country maps
General open
source information
Satellite images
Regional maps
Infrastructure
Satellite images
Open source plant
description
World map
Country level
Country level
safeguards data
Nuclear Site level
Site description
and lay-out
Buildings level
Building
description and
use
Building floors
and rooms
Function oriented view
Breakdown
Nuclear site level
Installation level
Facility level
Process/Unit level
Material Balance
Area (MBA)
Component level
Key measurement
points (KMP)
Containment &
Surveillance
measures
Function oriented view
Data
Nuclear site level
Installation level
Facility level
Status
Purpose
Type…
Physical
Inventory
Taking results
Process/Unit level
Design
information
Material Balance
Area (MBA)
Inventory changes
Movements
MBA
report
Component level
Key measurement
points (KMP)
Containment &
Surveillance
measures
Material/item
Type & procedure
Measurements
Signal sources
Alarms
Function oriented view
Verification
Nuclear site level
Installation level
Facility level
Status
Purpose
Type…
Inspection reports
(e.g. PIV)
Physical
Inventory
Taking results
Process/Unit level
Component level
Design
information
Material Balance
Area (MBA)
MBA
report
Pictures
Inspection reports
Inspection reports
MUF calculations
Variance of MUF
Received signals
and alarms
Video scenes
Inventory changes
movements
Key measurement
points (KMP)
Containment &
Surveillance
measures
Material/item
Type & procedure
measurements
Signal sources
Alarms
Operation oriented view
Breakdown
Nuclear site level
Site level activity
programme
Facility level
activity programme
Notification of
transfers
Operation oriented view
Data
Nuclear site level
Site level activity
programme
Overall
production
Facility level
activity programme
Operating/
refueling schedule
Outages
Notification of
transfers
Modifications
Construction
activities
Operation oriented view
Verification
Country production
Energy needs
Satellite images
Environmental
samples
Import/export
receipts
Nuclear site level
Site level activity
programme
Overall
production
Facility level
activity programme
Operating/
refueling schedule
Outages
Notification of
transfers
Modifications
Construction
activities
Conceptual scheme for site level assessment
SITE MODEL
State
declarations
Topology
Topology
Inferred
Site lay-out
Site
analysis
site topology
related data
Function
Design
information
Remote
surveillance
Function
Coherence
checking
Inferred
technical
characteristics
Operations
Environment
sampling
Operations
Inferred
Declared
program
operations
related data
Site
Assessment
Additional
declarations/
clarifications
Routine
inspections
Potential
proliferation
pathways
Gen. info
on fuel cycle
technologies
Satellite
imaging
Open Source
information
Other
observations
Platform
PC with Windows 98/NT
Use of COTS:
ESRI Arcview Version 3.2 as main GUI
with ESRI-ERDAS Image Analysis extension
Links to tools of MS windows
Links to DBMS: e.g. Access, Oracle
Links with CAD software
Links with internet
Satellite images
SPIN, KVR-1000. GSD 2m
IRS-1C, PAN sensor , GSD 5.8m
IKONOS, PAN sensor , GSD 1 m
Next steps
Further refinement of models
Development of fully operational pilot
application on Ispra site
Development of analysis procedures
Potential link with environmental monitoring
Use of terrain data (e.g. digital elevation maps),
meteorological data (e.g. prevailing wind fields) and
dispersion models:
to visualise and characterise sampling points
to support location of best places for environmental monitoring
to trace back from environmental samples to point of release
INL/EXT-09-16119
IAEA Safeguards
Monitoring Systems
&
Science and Technology
Challenges for
International Safeguards
Mark Schanfein
Topics
IAEA Safeguards and Unattended Monitoring
Systems
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Recommendations
Reprocessing: Aqueous and Pyro-chemical
Recommendations
Undeclared Facilities
Recommendations
Conclusions
The IAEA and Safeguards
As of December 2006: 925 Facilities were under IAEA Safeguards
Safeguarded Nuclear Material (excluding source material)
980 Metric Tons of Plutonium (Majority in Spent Fuel)
16 Metric Tons of High Enriched Uranium
1120 Metric Tons of Low Enriched Uranium
The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not
only about the declared nuclear material in a State but also
about the absence of undeclared material and activities.
Growth of nuclear power: 2007 estimate
growth in capacity from 370 GW(e) at the end of 2006, to 679
GW(e) in 2030. That would be an average growth rate of about
2.5%/yr.
Every State is a potential adversary
The Safeguards Challenge
At Declared Facilities: ..the timely detection of
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material
from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of
such diversion by the risk of early detection.
Timeliness criteria to draw conclusions varying from
approximately one week to approximately one year
depending on the form of the material, with metal having
the shortest timeliness criteria and waste the longest
(conversion or weaponization time)
Goal Quantities (or Significant Quantities) Approximate
quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into
account any conversion process involved, the possibility of
manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be
excluded.
Significant Quantities
Direct-Use
Nuclear
Material*
Indirect-Use
Nuclear
Material**
Material
Significant
Quantity
Safeguards apply to:
Pu (/= 20%]
25 kg
U-235 Contained
U [U-235/=20%; Pu, HEU and/or U-233
in scrap or other miscellaneous impure
compounds
Order of Weeks
(1-3)
Pu, HEU or U-233 in irradiated fuels
Order of Months
(1-3)
U containing < 20% U-235 and U-233; Th
Order of one year
Did You Know?
According to the
International Atomic
Energy Agency
(IAEA), 25 kg of HEU
(about the size of a
grapefruit) or 8 kg of
plutonium (about the
size of a soda can
represent a
significant quantity
required to make a
crude nuclear
weapon.
The Safeguards Challenge
IAEA High Level Diversion Scenarios
Primary safeguards goal is the timely
detection of the diversion of a
significant quantity
Abrupt Diversion
The immediate diversion of a significant quantity or greater in a
short time (typically a conversion period: 2 weeks to 1 month)
Protracted Diversion
The diversion of portions of a significant quantity over extended
periods of time leading to a significant quantity or greater
(typically an inventory period: 6 months 1 year)
INFCIRC/153 The Structure & Content of
Agreements Between the Agency & States in
Connection with the NPT
PART I, paragraph 4, The Agreement should provide that
safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed:
(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological
development of the State
in the field of peaceful nuclear
activities, including international exchange of nuclear
materials;
(b) To avoid undue interference in the States peaceful nuclear
activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and
(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices
required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear
activities.
What is an Unattended Monitoring
System (UMS)?
It is a system that automatically monitors the flow
of nuclear materials 24 hours a day / 365 days a
year without the need for human interaction
It is permanently installed in a nuclear facility
It is computer based for data retrieval either onsite or remotely
It may use a variety of sensors such as radiation,
pressure, temperature, flow, vibration, &
electromagnetic fields to collect qualitative or
quantitative data
All external components are in tamper indicating
enclosures
Why does the International Atomic
Energy Agency use UMS?
It provides the highest level of safeguards
assurance through continuous monitoring of
activities in nuclear facilities.
It minimizes impact on the facility operator by
allowing uninterrupted facility operation
It minimizes the impact on the Agency by
reducing inspector visits and thereby
inspection resources including the high cost
of world-wide travel
It reduces radiation exposure to personnel and
can operate in radiation areas too dangerous
for humans
Mid-2004 IAEA Worldwide Statistics of UMS
90 Systems Installed (+115 Mid-2005)
79 Radiation Based
5 Thermo-hydraulic Based
6 Process Monitoring Based
44 Facilities
22 Countries
SGOA - 30 Systems (SE Asia)
SGOB - 40 Systems (N. & S. America,
Africa, India, Pakistan, Iran)
SGOC 20 Systems (Europe,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine)
What are the Primary Goals of UMS?
No loss of safeguards significant
data
Assurance that the data is authentic
How are these Goals Obtained?
Use of high reliability and/or redundant critical
components and/or reduced reliance on low
reliability components
Use of uninterruptible power supply
Employs multi-layer Security
Objectives for Unattended
Measurement Systems
Collect SG-information without Inspectors
Presence:
Verify flow and inventory of nuclear materials
Minimize intrusiveness on Operator
Reduce IAEA & Operator manpower
requirements
Decrease radiation exposure
Standardize hardware and software
Minimize maintenance
Minimize training
Security Methods
Software controlled
Tamper indicating enclosures
C/S on detector head and electronics
Visual Inspection of components and cables
Efficiency check with normalization source
Supervision of maintenance
Cross correlation with other SG measures
Use of unique data signature on all digital data
Encrypted data transmission between cabinets and
for remote monitoring
Uninterrupted Power Supplies
IAEA Metal E-Cap Seals
Some Tamper Indicating Features
ENGM Detector
Tamper Indicating Conduit
Security Solution: VPN
Netscreen 5XP or 5XT
Meets FIPS 140 Level 2
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